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We introduce technological diﬀerences in a Heckscher-Ohlin model and
study how the technology and endowment diﬀerences interact to determine
the eﬀects of trade on factor prices. When the endowment eﬀect is dominant
in determining the autarky relative factor prices, the relative factor prices of
trading countries adjust in converging directions with trade if and only if the
capital-rich country has a comparative advantage in the capital-intensive
sector. Adjustments in converging directions could be excessive. Relative
factor prices tend to converge if the technological comparative advantage is
small for given relative endowments or if the relative endowment diﬀerence
is large for a given technological comparative advantage.
keywords: factor-price convergence, comparative advantage, technolog-
ical comparative advantage, skill premium
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1. Introduction
Do factor prices of trading countries get closer as a result of in-
ternational trade? This questionh a st a k e no nn e wp o l i c ys i g n i ﬁcance
in recent years as a result of the simultaneous increase of the skill
premium in the United States and its trade volume with NIEs.1 If
the ratios of rent (including the skill premium) to wage of the trad-
ing countries converge, the lower rent to wage ratio — typically in
the capital-rich country — will increase after trade. Motivated by the
increasing USA—NIE trade, we study the behavior of factor prices
of trading countries in a simple framework that nevertheless explic-
itly features technological diﬀerences among countries. We introduce
Hicks neutral technological diﬀerences in a 2—country, 2—good, 2—factor
Heckscher-Ohlin trade model and study how the technology and en-
dowment diﬀerences interact to determine the circumstances in which
the relative factor prices converge or diverge.2
1There is a closely related but distinct question of the
extent to which trade with NIEs is increasing the skill premium in the United
States. See Burtless[1995], S.J. Davis[1992], Freeman[1995], Krugman[1995][1997].
In Korea, trade volume grew from 21% of GDP in 1963 to 61% of GDP in 1994
while the skill premium increased brieﬂyi nt h eﬁrst half of the 1970s and then
gradually decreased. The downward trend seems to have bottomed out.
2Previous papers that combine endowment and technological diﬀerences in-
clude Davis[1995] and Xu[1993]. Davis shows how technological diﬀerences in
intra-industry goods among countries can generate intra-industry trade even un-
der constant returns to scale. Xu, combining two papers by Dornbusch-Fischer-
Samuelson[1977][1980], studies complete specialization equilibria in Cobb-Douglas
economies with 2 countries and many goods. Neither of these studies focuses on
the eﬀect of trade on relative factor prices, however.Impact of Trade on Wages 3
Ohlin[1933] proposed a thesis that international trade in goods
tends to move factor prices toward equalization.3 Samuelson[1948], in
trying to prove Ohlin’s thesis, found that under his conditions, the
movement was complete rather than partial. Later, Samuelson[1971]
claimed that Ohlin’s thesis could be vindicated in a speciﬁcf a c t o r s
model. Uzawa[1959] attempted to prove Ohlin’s thesis in a model
with many goods and factors but he needed a very specialized model
to do that. Deardorﬀ[1986] showed that relative factor prices always
converged with trade in goods in a Cobb-Douglas international econ-
omy when there were no technological diﬀerences among countries.
Dixit and Norman[1980] suggested a convergence criterion in terms
of correlation but then showed that such a result could be hoped for
only under very special conditions. Land[1959] and Stewart[1976],
on the other hand, gave a graphical example where the relative fac-
tor prices of countries diverged after the international trade in goods
opened. Their ‘counter-example’ came in a two-country model with
three goods and two factors and no technological diﬀerences between
the countries. However, perhaps the most natural instances of such ex-
amples come from a model that allows technological diﬀerences among
3Ohlin writes(page 66, [1933]), “The tendency toward equalization of factor
prices is explained as follows: goods containing a large proportion of relatively
abundant and cheap factors are exported and these factors become more scarce,
whereas goods containing a large proportion of scantily supplied and expensive
factors are imported and the latter becomes less scarce. Trade consequently acts as
a substitute for the movement of productive factors and reduces the disadvantages
arising from their immobility.”Impact of Trade on Wages 4
n a t i o n sa sw es h o wi nt h i sp a p e r .
The trade equilibrium relative output price forms between autarky
relative output prices. With non-reversal of factor intensities, the
rent/wage ratio in a country is an increasing function of the rela-
tive price of the capital-intensive good. Thus, rent/wage of a country
increases (resp. falls) after trade opens if the country has a compara-
tive advantage in the capital-intensive good (resp. the labor-intensive
good). A capital-rich country has a comparative advantage in the
capital-intensive good unless it has a strong technological compara-
tive advantage in producing the labor-intensive good.
The relative factor prices of trading countries adjust in converging
directions with trade if the country with a lower autarky rent/wage has
a comparative advantage in the capital-intensive good and in diverg-
ing directions if the comparative advantage is in the labor-intensive
sector. When the converging movements of the relative factor prices
are small, the relative factor prices converge in a clear-cut way. When
the movements are larger but not excessive, the relative factor prices
converge as a result of trade but the rank order of relative factor prices
among countries may reverse. When the adjustments in converging
directions are large, the relative factor price can diverge with trade. If
the country with lower autarky rent/wage has a comparative advan-
tage in the labor-intensive sector, the relative factor prices move away
from each other, thus diverging in a clear-cut way.Impact of Trade on Wages 5
Relative factor prices tend to converge if the technological com-
parative advantage is not strong for given relative endowments or if
t h er e l a t i v ee n d o w m e n td i ﬀerence is large for a given technological
comparative advantage. Excessive diﬀerences in relative technology
or endowments cause one or both countries to specialize in one good.
With specialization, however, further expansion of technological dif-
ferences may not worsen relative factor price diﬀerentials.
Section 1.1 describes the concept of relative factor price conver-
gence. Section 2 describes the model and assumptions. Section 3
studies the determination of autarky relative factor prices and the
relative factor prices at a diversiﬁcation trade equilibrium. Section 4
studies a trade equilibrium where a country’s production is specialized
in one good. Section 5 introduces the relative factor price function and
describes its properties. Section 6 gives the main results on the con-
vergence and divergence of relative factor prices with trade. Section 7
studies the welfare eﬀects of trade on factors. The Stolper-Samuelson
theorem covers such eﬀects in the diversiﬁcation range. When we
expand the discussion to include specialization, we get a variety of
possible trade eﬀects on wages.
1.1. Relative Factor Price Convergence
Let (qa
i ,s a
i)a n d( qi,s i) be the positive autarky and after-trade
prices of goods and factors in country i = A,B, in terms of a nu-Impact of Trade on Wages 6
meraire good. After trade, qA is equal to qB. If factor prices equalize
after trade (sA = sB), they equalize independent of the choice of the
numeraire good; the factor prices have converged without any ambi-
guity.
If they do not, however, we need to compare the diﬀerence of sa
A
and sa
B versus that of sA and sB. But such comparisons are sensitive to
the choice of the numeraire good. Suppose that, in Japan (country A),
the autarky relative price of oranges (good 2) in terms of apples (good






B)=( 2 ,1,1,1). E x p r e s s e di no r -
ange units, there is no room for further factor price convergence since
sa
A = sa




2) respectively. In contrast, if we isolate the factor prices, we
can compare normalized versions of these and say that the relative
autarky factor prices are the same.
For this reason, we use relative factor prices, factor prices expressed
in terms of a factor and consider (sa
A,s a
B)v e r s u s( sA,s B)i n d e p e n d e n t
of the goods’ prices.4 Expressed in the units of the second factor, si
becomes (ρi,1). When ρa
i <ρ a
i0, the relative factor prices move in
converging directions with trade if ρa
i <ρ i and ρi0 <ρ a
i0; in diverging
directions with trade if ρi <ρ a
i <ρ a
i0 <ρ i0. Relative factor prices
4Uzawa[1959] uses the Euclidean distance of the factor prices of the two coun-
tries expressed in terms of a good. This may explain why he needs such stringent
assumptions as the linearity of excess demand functions.Impact of Trade on Wages 7






















ρi .5 It is clear that relative factor prices diverge with trade if
they move in diverging directions with trade.
2. Economy
There are two countries A,B indexed by i and two goods 1,2i n -
dexed by j and two factors, labor L and capital K, whose rental rates
are w and r respectively. We may interpret L as unskilled labor and
K as a composite representing human and physical capital. Country
i has the production function yij = tijfj(Kij,L ij) of good j, where
tij > 0a n dfj satisﬁes constant returns to scale and the marginal
products are positive. Production functions are diﬀerent across coun-
tries by eﬃciency factors tij only. Unit cost function of yij is denoted
by cij(r,w). It will be convenient to work with a unit cost function
φj(r,w) corresponding to fj since φj(r,w) is common across coun-
tries. Since production of 1




e Kj, e Lj
´
be the factor requirements of pro-
ducing one unit of fj,j=1 ,2. Then, φj(r,w)=r e Kj + we Lj,j=1 ,2.
For good j, e kj ≡
e Kj
e Lj ;f o rc o u n t r yi, Ki,L i are endowments and ki ≡
Ki
Li .
Sector 1 employs more capital-intensive method of production than
5In particular, if both ρA and ρB are between ρa
A and ρa
B, relative factor prices
converge with trade according to the deﬁnition. For example, ρa












A.Impact of Trade on Wages 8
sector 2 for each set of factor prices (no factor intensity reversals). We
denote by pi the price of good 1 in country i in the units of good 2.
Country i has a comparative advantage in good 1 (resp. in good 2)
if her autarky relative price pa
i is less than (resp. greater than) the
autarky relative price pa









tB2. It follows that
tA
tB = t2
t1. Country i has a technological comparative advantage(TCA)
in good 1 (resp. in good 2) if her relative technological eﬃciency ti is
less than (resp. greater than) the relative technological eﬃciency ti0 of
country i0. Both countries share a homothetic welfare function that is
strictly quasi-concave and has positive partial derivatives. The homo-
theticity assumption implies that the ratio of the demands for goods
at country i is independent of her income level and thus is a func-
tion of relative output price pi. When international trade opens, only
goods may be traded. Transportation cost is zero. The markets are
competitive. We shall develop a method that allows us to analyze the
diversiﬁcation equilibrium (where both countries produce both goods)
and the specialization equilibrium (where some country produces only
one good) in a single framework. We assume that countries diversify
at autarky.Impact of Trade on Wages 9
3. Diversiﬁcation
When country i (= A,B)p r o d u c e sb o t hg o o d s ,h e rf a c t o rp r i c e s
satisfy: piti1 = φ1(wi,r i),t i2 = φ2(wi,r i). We denote the relative
factor price of country i by ρi ≡
ri
wi and the autarky relative output
and factor prices of country i by pa
i and ρa












degree 1. It will be convenient to work with the relative cost function
ϕ(ρ) ≡
φ1(1,ρ)
φ2(1,ρ). When country i diversiﬁes,
pi = tiϕ(ρi)
We use the following properties of ϕ. The proof is given in the
appendix.
Lemma 1 (1) ϕ0(ρ) > 0,ϕ 00(ρ) < 0 and d
dρ
ϕ(ρ)
ρ < 0, (2) ϕ(λρ) <
λϕ(ρ) and λϕ−1(p) <ϕ −1(λp) for λ>1.
3.1. Autarky relative prices
We simplify autarky equilibrium conditions by stating them in
terms of the relative factor prices. In the following, homotheticity of
the welfare function gives δ, an increasing function of pa
i.W ed e r i v e
the conditions in Autarky Equilibrium Conditions in Appendix. For










































relative factor price ρa
i is determined by:
−ti
e K1 − kie L1








i where xi and yi are consumptions of good 1 and 2, respec-





this case, (2) becomes −ϕ(ρa
i)
e K2−kie L2
e K1−kie L1 = b
1−b. Since the latter equa-
tion does not involve technology eﬃciency factors, ρa
i is independent
of them. Lemma 2 shows that when welfare function is Cobb-Douglas,
the capital-rich country has a lower autarky rent/wage ratio. This fact
makes the relationship between technological comparative advantage
and the factor price convergence particularly simple to describe in the
Cobb-Douglas welfare function case.Impact of Trade on Wages 11
Lemma 2 The autarky equilibrium relative factor price ρa
i (as well
as pa
i) for a given (ti,ki) is unique. If the shared welfare function
is Cobb-Douglas, the autarky relative factor prices are independent
of relative eﬃciency factors tA,t B and the capital-rich country has a




3.2. Trade equilibrium with diversiﬁcation
We ﬁrst study the case where both countries produce both goods.
When the countries share a homothetic welfare function, the equilib-



















e L2(ρi),i = A,B.
Homotheticity of the welfare function gives the ﬁrst equation where
δ is an increasing function. From the last two equations for i = A,B,
6These conditions may be derived from the equilibrium conditions involving
individual factor prices along the same line as in the Appendix A.2.Impact of Trade on Wages 12
output levels {yij} are determined as functions of endowments and
relative factor prices. Then, from the ﬁrst and second equations,
i = A,B,t h ev a l u e so fρA,ρ B,pare determined. At a diversiﬁca-


























Lemma 3 Suppose pa
i <p a
i0 and let p be the trade equilibrium price
(of good 1).T h e n ,pa
i <p<p a
i0.
Proof. It is enough to consider the case of pa
A <p a
B. The other cases
are handled in the same way. Suppose that pa
A <p a
B ≤ p. If the
countries diversify at the trade equilibrium, then, from the equations
on the second line in 3, ρa
A <ρ A and ρa
B ≤ ρB. Country A employs
less capital-intensive techniques in the production of both goods and,
to satisfy resource requirements, must produce more of good 1, whose
sector is capital-intensive, and less of good 2. Similarly, country B
produces more of good 1 and less of good 2. Thus, the supply of good
1 increases and the supply of good 2 decreases. However, since the
price of good 1 increases, this contradicts the ﬁrst equilibrium equation
in 3. If a country specializes, she specializes in good 1 (see Lemma 4
below). So, the same argument applies.Impact of Trade on Wages 13



















An equilibrium factor price (wi,r i) corresponding to output price
p satisﬁes p ≤ 1
ti1φ1(wi,r i), 1 ≤ 1
ti2φ2(wi,r i), where a strict ineqality
for good j =1 ,2 means that good j is not produced by country i.
If country i specializes in the production of good j, the endowment
vector of country i is orthogonal to the unit cost curve of j at the equi-
librium factor prices by the Shepard lemma. If country i diversiﬁes,
the endowment vector lies in the diversiﬁcation cone generated by the
gradients of φ1 and φ2 at the equilibrium factor prices.Impact of Trade on Wages 14
Figure 1 describes how equilibrium factor prices and production
pattern change as the (relative) price of good 1 increases from p to p0
in country i. The two radially parallel curves are the level curves of
p = 1
ti1φ1(wi,r i)a n dp0 = 1
ti1φ1(wi,r i) while the steeper curve is that
of 1 = 1
ti2φ2(wi,r i). Initially, country i diversiﬁes at C and the slope
of OC is the equilibrium relative factor price. The endowment vector
of country i is in the diversiﬁcation cone at C.A tp0
i, the new factor
prices must lie somewhere on ABD0. Since the endowment vector was
in the diversiﬁcation cone at C initially, it cannot be orthogonal to a
unit cost curve at any point on the curve segment AB (not including
B) nor at any point on the curve segment C0D0 (not including C0).
Thus, we can narrow down the possible factor prices to the arc BC.
If country i0s endowment vector is in the diversiﬁcation cone at B,
she diversiﬁes her production at p0
i. Otherwise, country i specializes
in good 1 at p0
i. The new relative factor prices is give by the slope of
a ray between OB and OC.
If country i specializes in good 1 at price p, then her endowment
vector is orthogonal to the unit cost curve of good 1 at a point on
CD. When the price increases to p0, the same condition will be met
at a radial extension of the original point on C0D0. Thus, the relative
factor price does not change. Symmetric statements hold when the
price of good 1 goes down.
Lemma 4 Suppose that the price of good 1 in country i increases fromImpact of Trade on Wages 15
p to p0. If country i diversiﬁed at p, the relative factor price increases
with the new equilibrium. If country i specializes in production at p0,
she specializes in good 1. If country i specialized in good 1 at p,s h e
continues to specialize in good 1 at p0 and the relative factor price does
not change.
When country i specializes in say, good 1, the factor intensity in
sector 1 equals the relative factor endowment of country i (e k1(ρi)=ki).
Since the equation does not involve technology, the relative factor price
of a country specializing in a good does not change as technologies
change so long as the country continues to specializes in the good.
In particular, when both countries specialize in production, a change
in technology does not aﬀect ρA,ρ B so long as they remain in the
same specialization pattern. This is a nice contrast to the factor price
equalization theorem where factor prices stay constant under certain
changes in endowments that maintain a diversiﬁcation equilibrium.
For a given endowment, those technologies that generate a type of
complete specialization generate the same relative factor prices.
5. Relative Factor Price Function
The relative factor price function, ρ(p;ti,k i), gives the equilibrium
relative factor prices corresponding to relative output prices. From
Lemma 4, there are prices p
i, pi,p
i < pi for country i(= A,B)s u c hImpact of Trade on Wages 16
that she specializes in the production of good 1 if p ≥ pi, in good 2
if p ≤ p
i and diversiﬁes if p
i <p<pi. The relative factor price of
country i is determined once p,ti,k i are given and is constant over a
specialization zone.7 For country i(= A,B), let ρ
i and ρi be deﬁned
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i if p ≤ p
i
(4)
When the values of ti,k i are ﬁxed, we write ρi(p) ≡ ρ(p;ti,k i),i=
A,B. Since ϕ is strictly increasing due to the factor intensity condi-
tion, ρi is an increasing function of p and is strictly increasing in the
diversiﬁcation range.
We illustrate by an example how the function ρi(p)m a yb eu s e dt o
determine the behavior of relative factor prices with trade. Consider
the case of no TCA (tA = tB). If country A is capital-rich (kA >k B),
then, ρA(·) ≤ ρB(·) (see Fig. 2 below). Since we show in Lemma 6
that
dρa




B. Since the trade equi-
librium price p is between pa
A and pa
B (Lemma 3), ρA(pa
A) <ρ A(p) ≤
ρB(p) <ρ B(pa













ti)i f tiϕ(e k
−1





2 (ki)i f p ≤ tiϕ(e k
−1
2 (ki))Impact of Trade on Wages 17
B diversify at autarky where {ρi} are strictly increasing. Thus, rela-
tive factor prices always converge after trade when the countries have
the same relative technological eﬃciencies regardless of whether one
or both countries specialize at the trade equilibrium. Deardorﬀ[1986]
shows that the relative factor prices converge when there are no wel-
fare and technology diﬀerences among countries and all welfare and
production functions are Cobb-Douglas. In the 2 × 2 × 2m o d e l ,o u r
result generalizes that of Deardorﬀ.8
We show how the graph of ρ(p;ti,k i)s h i f t sa s( ti,k i) changes. As






ti decreases, the graph of ρ(p;ti,k i) ‘shifts’ to the left. Proposition 5
makes this precise. The situation is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. In
the ﬁgures, CC is a benchmark. In Figure 2, CC shifts to BB as the
capital/labor endowment ratio decreases. In Figure 3, C shifts to A
as the capital-intensive sector 1 becomes more eﬃcient relatively to
sector 2 (a decrease in t).
Lemma 5 As country i (= A,B) becomes more capital-rich, ρi,ρ
iand
pi,p
i decrease and ρ(·;ti,k i) decreases. As country i becomes more
eﬃcient in producing good 1 relative to good 2 (a decrease in ti), ρi,
ρ
i do not change, pi,p
i decrease and ρ(·;ti,k i) increases. If kA >k B
and tA >t B,ρ (·;tA,k A) <ρ (·;tB,k B).
8Deardorﬀ allows any ﬁnite number of goods. However, the result does not
generalize to this case as the Land[1959] example shows.Impact of Trade on Wages 18
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1 are strictly decreasing functions. Then, the ﬁrst two statements
are immediate from deﬁnition. Consequently, when kA >k B and
tA >t B,ρ (·;tA,k A) ≤ ρ(·;tB,k A) ≤ ρ(·;tB,k B). The second inequality
is strict except for those p at which the economies represented by
(tB,k A)a n d( tB,k B) diversify in production. However, for these values
of p,t h eﬁrst inequality is strict. Thus, ρ(·;tA,k A) <ρ (·;tB,k B).
Figure 7 illustrates the situation.
6. Main Results
We ﬁrst determine how autarky relative factor and output prices
react as relative factor endowment or relative technological eﬃciency






∂k , but not
∂ρa
∂t
without further assumptions. Lemma 2 shows that
∂ρa
∂t =0w h e nt h e
welfare function is Cobb-Douglas.








Lemma 7 At autarky, ρa
i <ρ a















ti0 since ϕ is
strictly increasing.Impact of Trade on Wages 20
When a capital-rich country A has just enough TCA in the labor-
intensive sector (tA = tA >t B), the countries end up with no com-
parative advantage (pa
A = pa
B). The following proposition compares,
wherever possible, (a) autarky relative output prices, (b) autarky rel-
ative factor prices and (c) after-trade relative factor prices of countries
depending on the location of tA relative to tB and tA.
Proposition 8 Assume that country A is capital-rich (kA >k B), and
ﬁxt h ev a l u eo ftB. (a) There is tA >t B such that pa
A = pa
B at tA = tA,
pa
A <p a
B for tA < tA and pa
A >p a
B for tA > tA. (b) There is an open
interval containing [tB, tA] on which ρa
A <ρ a
B. (c) If tA = tB, then
ρA = ρB at a diversiﬁcation trade equilibrium and ρA <ρ B when a
country specializes. If tB <t A,ρ A <ρ B at any trade equilibrium. If
tA <t B,ρ A >ρ B at a diversiﬁcation trade equilibrium.9





B when kA >k B and tA = tB. On the other hand, for tA
large enough, pa
B <t Bϕ(e k
−1
1 (kB)) <t Aϕ(e k
−1
2 (kA)) <p a
A. Thus, there
is a level tA of tA at which pa
A = pa
B. Since pa
A strictly increases as
tA increases, tA >t B and pa
A <p a
B for tA < tA and pa
A >p a
B for
tA > tA. (b) From Lemma 7, ρa
A <ρ a










B < 1 ≤
tA






tB at tA = tA,ρ a
A <ρ a
B
9It is also possible here that country A specializes in good 1 or country B
specializes in good 2 and ρA is greater than ρB.Impact of Trade on Wages 21
for tA on [tB,tA]. Since pa







continues to be satisﬁed in an open interval containing [tB,tA]. (c) If
kA >k B and tA = tB,ρ (·;tA,k A) ≤ ρ(·;tB,k B)f r o mL e m m a5a n d
thus ρA ≤ ρB. Since the curves of ρ(·;tA,k A)a n dρ(·;tB,k B)o v e r l a p
in this case precisely in the diversiﬁcation range, ρA = ρB if and
only if at a diversiﬁcation trade equilibrium. Lemma 5 shows that if
kA >k B and tB <t A,ρ (·;tA,k A) <ρ (·;tB,k B). Thus, ρA <ρ B in this
range. Finally, since tAϕ(ρA)=p = tBϕ(ρB)a tad i v e r s i ﬁcation trade
equilibrium, tA <t B implies ϕ(ρA) >ϕ (ρB). Since ϕ is increasing,
ρA >ρ B.
Proposition 9 determines exactly when the rent/wage of a country
increases or decreases.
Proposition 9 Suppose that country A is capital-rich (kA >k B).
Then, the rent/wage of country A increases and that of country B
d e c r e a s e sa sar e s u l to ft r a d e( ρa
A <ρ A and ρB <ρ a
B) i fa n do n l yi f
tA < tA. Similarly, ρa
A >ρ A and ρB >ρ a
B if and only if tA > tA. In
particular, relative factor prices of countries never increase or decrease
together when trade opens.
Proof. From Proposition 8, pa
A <p a
B if and only if tA < tA. Since
the trade equilibrium p forms between autarky prices (pa
A <p<p a
B)
and the relative factor price function is increasing (strictly increasing
in the diversiﬁcation range), ρa
A <ρ A and ρB <ρ a
B.Impact of Trade on Wages 22
Suppose that country A has a lower autarky rent/wage than coun-
try B. Then, lemma 10 shows that the relative factor prices of coun-
tries adjust in converging directions with trade if country A has a
comparative advantage in the capital-intensive sector and in diverg-
ing directions if the comparative advantage is in the labor-intensive
sector.






















i ) ⇐⇒ ρa
i <ρ i and ρi0 <ρ a
i0.

























ρi0(p). Conversely, ρi(p)=ρi <ρ a
i = ρi(pa
i) implies that p<p a
i.
Similarly, pa
i0 <p ,so pa
i0 <p a









It is immediate that pa
i <p<p a
i0 if and only if ρi(pa
i) <ρ i(p)a n d
ρi0(p) <ρ i0(pa
i0).
We shall show that when tA is close to tB, the relative factor prices
converge with trade. Lemma 11 proves a part of it.
Lemma 11 Suppose country A is capital-rich (kA >k B) and ﬁx tB,
the relative technological eﬃciency of country B. If the TCA of country
A in the capital-intensive sector is suﬃciently weak (i.e., tA <t B andImpact of Trade on Wages 23
tA is suﬃciently close to tB), then ρa
A <ρ a
B and the relative factor
prices converge with trade.
Proof. See Appendix.



















































Theorems 13, 14 describe, in terms of technology and autarky
prices — information available before trade starts — how relative fac-
tor prices behave with trade. Figure 4—Figure 8 illustrate Theorems
13, 14.10 Country A is capital-rich in the ﬁgures. In Figure 4, coun-
try A has a strong TCA in the capital-intensive sector (sector 1). As
we move from Figure 4 to Figure 8, country A l o s e st h i sa d v a n t a g e
continuously until she has a strong TCA in the labor-intensive sec-
tor (sector 2). In the ﬁgures, short dotted lines map autarky relative
output prices to autarky relative factor prices. The long dotted lines





welfare function wi = xb
iy
1−b
i ,i= A,B ; j =1 ,2. Here, xi and yi are consumptions
of country i of good 1 and 2 respectively, The values of {KA =1 ,L A =1 ,K B =
1
1.5,L B =1 ,t B =1 ,α 1 = 2
3,α 2 = 1
3,b= 1
2} are constant and tA is changed
for diﬀerent graphs. Equilibrium autarky and trade prices are computed by a
program.Impact of Trade on Wages 24
map trade equilibrium relative output prices to relative factor prices
of countries A and B.
Figure 4, drawn for the values of {tA =0 .7,t B =1 }, shows that
the relative factor price for country A rises sharply after trade and
that of country B falls sharply. The movements are in converging
directions. However, the movements are large and the relative factor
prices diverge with trade. Also, the rank order of relative factor prices
change after trade. Note that country B is specializing in good 2 at
the trade equilibrium. In Figure 5, drawn for the values of {tA =
0.8,t B =1 }, the situation is similar to that of Figure 4 except that
both countries diversify at the trade equilibrium. In Figure 6, drawn
for the values of {tA =0 .9,t B =1 }, the relative factor prices converge
somewhat after trade. Nevertheless, for individual countries, there
are large movements of relative factor prices and the rank order of
relative factor prices change after trade. These ﬁrst three graphs,
where tA <t B, may represent plausible values for the USA trade
with the newly industrializing economies. In Figure 7, drawn for the
values of {tA =1 .1,t B =1 }, the relative factor prices move a bit in
converging directions and the relative factor prices converge clearly.
In Figure 8, drawn for the values of {tA =1 .2,t B =1 }, relative prices
move in diverging directions.
The capital-rich country has a lower autarky relative factor prices
ρa if the TCA is not strong (Proposition 8b). The proof of Proposi-Impact of Trade on Wages 25
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t i o n8a l s om a k e sc l e a rt h a tt h er a n g eo ftA on which the capital-rich
country A has a lower autarky relative factor prices ρa extends to a
considerably larger area than [tB,tA]. When tA is very diﬀerent from
tB, however, we cannot make a deﬁnite statement since the inﬂuence
of technology on autarky relative factor prices is ambiguous in general.
For such values of tA, we take the neutral technology eﬀect of a Cobb-
Douglas welfare function case as a base and assume that the capital-
rich country has a lower autarky rent/wage. In Theorems 13 and 14,
relative factor prices move in converging directions with trade if the
capital-rich country A has a comparative advantage in the capital-
intensive sector while they move in diverging directions if she has a
comparative advantage in the labor-intensive sector. Even in the for-Impact of Trade on Wages 28
mer case, however, the relative factor prices could diverge; the move-
ments can be excessive if the TCA of country A in the capital-intensive
sector is strong unless specialization mitigates the movements. Theo-
rem 13 shows that relative factor prices converge with trade if TCA is
not too strong. Suppose that country A is capital abundant (kA >k B)
and ﬁx the relative eﬃciency factor tB for country B. If tA is between
tB and tA , we get a nice convergence ρa
A <ρ A ≤ ρB <ρ a
B (Theorem
13 a and b). If tA is smaller than tB but is not much smaller, the
relative factor prices also converge with trade (Theorem 13c).
Theorem 13 (factor price convergence) Suppose country A is capital-
rich (kA >k B). (a) If there is no TCA (tA = tB), then, ρa
A <ρ A ≤
ρB <ρ a
B. (b) If country A has a weak TCA in the labor-intensive sector
that country A has a comparative advantage in the capital-intensive
sector (tB <t A < tA), then ρa
A <ρ A <ρ B <ρ a
B. (c) If country A
has a weak TCA in the capital-intensive sector (tA <t B but tA is
suﬃciently close to tB), then ρa
A <ρ a
B and the relative factor prices
converge with trade.
Proof. (a) Proposition 8 gives ρa
A <ρ a
B, ρA ≤ ρB and pa
A <p a




A <ρ A and ρB <ρ a
B. (b) From Lemma 10, ρa
A <ρ A and
ρB <ρ a
B. From Proposition 8, ρA <ρ B. ( c )T h i si ss h o w ni nL e m m a
11.Impact of Trade on Wages 29
Theorem 14 shows that relative factor prices diverge with trade if
the TCA is strong. As tA increases, pa
A increases and if tA is greater
than tA,p a
A becomes greater than pa
B. If ρa
A continues to be less or
equal to ρa
B here, relative factor prices diverge (Theorem 14a). In






B ≤ 1 obtains, the relative factor prices diverge at a diversiﬁcation
equilibrium (Theorem 14b).11
Theorem 14 (factor price divergence) Suppose country A is capital-
rich (kA >k B) and assume ρa
A ≤ ρa
B in the ranges of tA considered
below. (a) If country A has a strong TCA in the labor-intensive sector
that she has a comparative advantage in the sector (tA <t A), then
ρA <ρ a
A ≤ ρa
B <ρ B. (b) If country A has a strong TCA in the






B, then the relative factor prices
diverge with trade at a diversiﬁcation equilibrium.









If a capital-rich country enjoys TCA in the capital-intensive sector
or if there is no TCA (tA ≤ tB), then the strong divergence case in
Theorem 14a cannot occur. In Theorem 14b,i ti sp o s s i b l et h a tf a c t o r
prices converge if a country specializes. There is an example where
11In Theorem 13, the relationship ρa
A <ρ a
B is derived. In Theorem 14a,t h e r ei s
an open interval greater than tA on which ρa
A <ρ a
B holds; otherwise, the relation-
ship is assumed.in Theorem 14.Impact of Trade on Wages 30
the relative factor prices even equalize (ρA = ρB) with very small
tA
tB when one country specializes. Also in Theorem 14b,t h eo r d e ro f
relative factor prices change from ρa
A <ρ a
B at autarky to ρA >ρ B after
trade.12
For Theorems 15 and 16, we suppose that country A has a TCA
in the capital-intensive sector. In contrast to Theorems 13 and 14,
Theorems 15 and 16 show that for a given TCA, the farther apart the
relative endowment of country A is from that of country B, the more
likely the relative factor prices converge with trade in goods. We start
with given values of tA,t B,t A <t B and kB. Since
∂pa
∂t > 0f r o mL e m m a




∂k < 0,p a
A increases as





B if and only if kA < kA. Theorem 15 shows
that the relative factor prices converge with trade if kA < kA or kA is
l a r g er e l a t i v et okB.
Theorem 15 Suppose that country A has a TCA in the capital-intensive
sector (tA <t B). (a) If kA is suﬃciently smaller than kB that country
A has a comparative advantage in the labor-intensive sector (kA < kA),
then ρa
B <ρ B <ρ A <ρ a
A. (b) If kA is suﬃciently larger than kB, then
12When ρa
A,ρ a
B are independent of tA,t B as in the case of Cobb-Douglas welfare
functions, Theorems 13 and 14 can be interpreted in terms of the ratio tA
tB. Since
kA >k B, we have ρa
A <ρ a





A) > 1. Then, Theorem 13 (a), (b)
and (c) correspond respectively to the cases of tA
tB =1 ,1 < tA
tB <c ,tA
tB < 1 but






B < 1.Impact of Trade on Wages 31
ρa
A <ρ a
B and the relative factor prices converge with trade.
Proof. (a) Since
tB








A.F r o mL e m m a7 ,
ρa
B <ρ a
A. We have the same situation as Theorem 13b with country
indices A and B exchanged. The result follows in the same way. (b) If
kA > e k1(ρ
B)=e k1(e k
−1
2 (kB)), ρA = e k
−1
1 (kA) <ρ
B, since e k1 is a strictly
decreasing function. Then, ρA ≤ ρA <ρ
B ≤ ρB. On the other hand,





A) <ρ A <ρ B <ρ B(pa
B)=ρa
B.
Theorem 16 shows that if the relative endowments are similar for
a given TCA, the relative factor prices tend to diverge with trade.
Theorem 16a covers the case of kA <k A ≤ kB. In Theorem 16b, kA
increases from the value of kB. If the increase is small, endowment
diﬀerence plays a minor role in a possible departure of ρa
A from ρa
B.
If the impact of technological eﬃciencies on autarky relative factor








tA. In this case, the relative
factor prices diverge at a diversiﬁcation equilibrium.
Theorem 16 Suppose that country A has a TCA in the capital-intensive
sector (tA <t B). (a) If country A is labor-abundant but kA is suﬃ-
ciently close to kB that country A has a comparative advantage in the
capital-intensive sector (kA <k A ≤ kB) and if the endowment eﬀect is
dominant in determining the autarky relative factor prices (ρa
B ≤ ρa
A),
then ρB <ρ a
B ≤ ρa
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Proof. (a) For the ﬁxed TCA, tA <t B,p a
A <p a
B for kA <k A ≤ kB.
Thus, ρa
A <ρ A and ρB <ρ a
B. If ρa
B ≤ ρa

































Previously, we plotted relative factor prices of a country as a func-
tion of relative prices. We can plot the individual factor prices in the
same way. In Figure 9, w, the wage (of labor) in terms of good 2,
is plotted as a function of p (the price of good 1 in units of good 2).
Similarly, w
p is the wage in terms of good 1. The economy diversi-
ﬁes in the middle region. In the diversiﬁcation region, both w and w
p
are decreasing in p as the Stolper-Samuelson theorem states.13 Given
diﬀerent values of tA and tB, we can invoke the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem to assess welfare consequences of trade on a particular fac-
tor in a country if a diversiﬁcation equilibrium obtains. If country
A is capital-rich, country A is more likely to have a comparative ad-
vantage in the capital-intensive sector (pa
A <p a
B). Suppose, for ex-
ample, that the United States(country A) and China(country B)a r e
13Recall that sector 1 is capital-intensive.Impact of Trade on Wages 33
equally eﬃcient in the labor-intensive se c t o r( s e c t o r2 )b u tt h a tt h e
United States is more eﬃcient in the capital-intensive sector (sector





tA1 < 1. From Proposition 8, pa
A <p a
B. In this case,
the relative price of good 1 increases with trade in the United States.
At a diversiﬁcation trade equilibrium, the labor in the United States
unequivocally loses14 as a result of trade.15
When an economy specializes in good 1, a further increase in p
leaves the relative factor price ρ unchanged. As p increases in this
specialization region, w and r increase in the same proportion. Thus,
the wage in terms of good 1 is constant whereas the wage in terms
of good 2 increases. If the United States is already specializing in
good 1 or is suﬃciently close to its specialization (at least as far as
the trade sector is concerned, as some argue), a further increase in p
would increase rather than decrease the welfare of labor. In Figure 9,
the labor loses unequivocally as the relative price of good 1 increases
from pa to pb. If the price increases from pb to pc, however, the wage
in terms of good 1 decreases by a little whereas the wage in terms of
good 2 increases sharply, possibly leading to an increase of welfare for
labor.




B (this can happen only if tA >t B), however, pa
A decreases to p
with trade and thus the labor of country A unequivocally gains at a diversiﬁcation
equilibrium.Impact of Trade on Wages 34
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AA p p e n d i x
A1. Proof of Lemma 1
(1) Denote the factor requirements of producing one unit of fj as
e Kj and e Lj and let e kj =
e Kj
e Lj ,j=1 ,2. Using the Shepard’s lemma (φ
0
i =
e Ki) and the assumption that sector 1 employs more capital-intensive

















e k1 − e k2
´
> 0. Also,












e L1 + ρ e K1
´³
e L2 + ρ e K2
´
1






















ρ >ϕ 0(ρ), ϕ(λρ) <λ ϕ (ρ)w h e nλ>1. Writing p =
ϕ(ρ) and applying ϕ−1 to both sides of the inequalities, λϕ−1(p) <
ϕ−1(λp), for λ>1s i n c eϕ−1 is an increasing function.
A2. Equilibrium Conditions
Let yi1 and yi2 stand for the demands for good 1 and 2 respectively.




i) for some function δ of the relative price pa
i. This together
with the budget condition pa
iyi1+yi2 = ra
iKi+wa
i Li, give the demand
functions yi1 =
ra






































































The ﬁrst two equations are proﬁt maximization conditions. The
second two are product market equilibrium conditions. The last two
equations are factor market equilibrium conditions. There are ﬁve
independent equations (by the Walras’ law, we can eliminate one
product market equilibrium condition) and ﬁve variables. The ﬁrst
two equations yield the second equation in 1. And the second two
equations yield the ﬁrst equation in 1. Conversely, given a solution























ﬁrst two and the last two equilibrium conditions in 5 together im-
ply pa







the second two equations in 5.
A3. Proof of Lemma 2
Since we assume that a country diversiﬁes at autarky and since
pa
i = tiϕ(ρa
i), it is enough to show that ρa
i is unique. Dropping the
country index, the autarky equilibrium conditions yield −t
e K1−ke L1
e K2−ke L2 =
δ(tϕ(ρ)). Deﬁne:F ≡ t
³








0 > 0,ϕ 0(ρ) > 0, e K2 − ke L2 = e L2
³
e k2 − k
´
< 0, e K0
2 < 0, e K0
1 < 0, e L0
1 >Impact of Trade on Wages 37
0, e L0
















1 − ke L0
1
´
< 0. Since F = 0 at an equilibrium ρ, the equilibrium
ρ is unique. Next, observe ∂F
∂k = −δ(tϕ(ρ))e L2 − te L1 < 0. Thus,
∂ρ
∂k <
0. When shared welfare functions are Cobb-Douglas, the equilibrium
condition becomes −ϕ(ρ)
e K2−ke L2
e K1−ke L1 = b
1−b. Thus, the equilibrium ρ is
independent of t. Since
∂ρ
∂k < 0,k A >k B implies ρa
A <ρ a
B.
A4. Proof of Lemma 6
Dropping the country index, we start with an autarky equilib-
rium condition 2:−t
e K1−ke L1
e K2−ke L2 = δ(tϕ(ρa)). Let F ≡ t
³





e K2 − ke L2
´
. We can compute: ∂F
∂k = −te L1 −δ(tϕ(ρa))e L2 <






L = e k1
L1
L + e k2
L2
L , where e kj =
e Kj
e Lj and Kj,
Lj are factors employed in jth industry. Since a country diversiﬁes at
autarky and e k1 > e k2, e K1 − ke L1 > 0a n d e K2 − ke L2 < 0. Since e K0
1, e K0
2
are negative and e L0
1, e L0
2,δ





























∂k < 0. Now, ex-
press F in terms of t,pa : G(t,pa) ≡ t
³




e K2(ρa) − ke L2(ρa)
´
,
where ρa = ϕ−1(
pa






t ) < 0a n d∂G
∂t =
e K1 − ke L1 > 0. Thus,
∂pa
∂t > 0.
A5. Proof of Lemma 11
From Proposition 8, kA >k B and tA <t B imply pa
A <p a
B. If at
the trade equilibrium price p, ρA(p) ≤ ρB(p) (Proposition 8 shows
that this can happen only if a country specializes),ρ a
A = ρA(pa
A) <
ρA(p) ≤ ρB(p) <ρ B(pa
B)=ρa
B. Thus, the relative factor prices con-
verge. Now, consider the case of ρB(p) <ρ A(p). From the autarkyImpact of Trade on Wages 38
equilibrium conditions −tA
e K1−kAe L1
e K2−kAe L2 = δ(tAϕ(ρa









e K2 − kAe L2
´




A,t A) 6=0 . By the implicit function theorem, ρa
A is locally a
continuous function of tA, denoted as ρa
A(tA), near tB.S i n c ekA >k B
implies ρa
A(tB) <ρ a
B(tB) by Lemma 6, ρa
A(tA) <ρ a
B(tB)f o rtA close
to tB. Recall the deﬁnitions of ρA,ρ
B in 4. One can check that
ρA(p) >ρ B(p) can happen only if p is in I ≡ [tAϕ(ρ
B),t Bϕ(ρA)].
As tA increases to tB, ρA,ρ
B do not change while the interval I mono-









A(tA) <ρ A,ρ B <ρ a
B(tB). In the case ρB <ρ A,
ρa
A(tA)−ε<ρ B <ρ a
B(tB)a n dt h u s1<
ρA
ρB < 1+ ε
ρB < 1+ ε
ρa
A(tA)−ε → 1


















A for all tA (<t B)s u ﬃciently close to tB.
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